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possessed in exceptional measure, is sufficient, for the simple reason that none of them assures the creative power, the construction of new forms of statecraft or leadership on the path of human progress.

And this is why some statesmen—clever, exceptionally versatile, shrewd—come just to the verge of creative greatness, and then fail at the critical moment, vanishing in the mist of time, to be forgotten by the following generation.

ALL SET FOR THE CONFERENCE

As the Conference on the Limitation of Armament goes to work, the big preliminary fight, that for public sessions, has been lost. It is plainly the purpose of the Harding Administration not to insist upon all sessions being open, and that attitude is accepted as meaning that the important business will be transacted in private sittings, for there is no disposition apparent among the delegates from other nations to call for open sessions, although the Japanese leaders have talked of them favorably in general terms.

It is to be understood, however, that the Administration is at pains to assure all concerned, that while the public and the reporters will not be present when actual work is being done—the public sessions, it is expected, being merely formal functions—it is intended that the public shall be acquainted with what is proposed and what is done as soon as practicable. That assurance has a distinct value, in the minds of most observers of Washington affairs, because of the clear and definite policy that Secretary Hughes has followed since he assumed charge of the State Department. He has given his facts to the public in all cases at the earliest moment that could be done with propriety, and those who know his work believe implicitly that he intends to keep the people posted.

It is apparent that the conference will be in session many weeks. Matters are destined to arise which are not on the tentative agenda issued by Mr. Hughes some weeks ago. Some of the matters that will arise are ones that the Harding Administration did not regard favorably as subjects of discussion when the first steps toward organizing the business of the conference were being taken. For example, both the President and the Secretary of State declared against discussion of the debts due this country by foreign nations, and were very emphatic about it. Now, the understanding is that the debts will be discussed. It is believed by some of those in touch with affairs that the representative financial interests of the country urged upon the Administration that no definite and permanent settlement of troublesome world affairs could be made until the debts were given a stable basis and attention was given, at the same time, to the problem of foreign exchange.

Another subject which is not on the tentative agenda, but which those following the conference preliminaries expect to be an important feature, at least of the informal discussions between the statesmen, is the question of renewal or dissolution of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Among the foreign diplomats there is strong conviction that Secretary Hughes is determined to achieve the dissolution of this pact. Their belief is that the American leaders think the existence of this pact is no longer necessary for the protection either of British or Japanese interests, Germany and Russia, against whom it was originally aimed, being elimi-

nated for the present from the Asiatic situation. Also, the foreign diplomats believe that the American leaders think the continued existence of the pact may prove a temptation to Japan to do in the future some of the things in Asia that have caused much feeling against her, and thus, in view of the expanding American business and political interests in the Orient, cause serious friction between this country and Japan.

Because of the strong probability that the conference discussions will range far and wide, Secretary Hughes has decided that the question of reduction of naval armaments shall be given primary place. His hope, it appears, is that something concrete may be decided as to this before the conference goes afield, and that if the discussion of many subjects leads to confusion and futility, something, at least, will have been done to reduce the naval forces of the big powers, set up guards against future naval expansion, reach an understanding as to policy, and thus somewhat lessen the temptation to war which is lodged in big navies, and relieve the peoples concerned of some of their onerous taxes.

The attitude of the other nations is developing slowly, for they are cautious. Frenchmen indicate that their delegation will be disposed to stand with that of the United States, but they cannot consider reduction of land armaments unless a guarantee is given that aid will be supplied France should she be attacked. Italians say that Italy already has reduced her army to about 300,000, of which about one-half really are police, and that she cannot have a smaller army and be safe. Her navy, they say, is merely a squadron for the defense of Italy's long coast-line. The British who are here lay down as their basic proposition a desire to co-operate intimately with the United States all along the line. Behind that, it seems, is a sincere desire among some of them to dissolve their alliance with Japan. Also, there is a tentative inquiry as to whether the United States would enter an alliance with them, which usually is answered in the negative. As to the British navy, Lord Lee, First Lord of the Admiralty, who is one of the British delegates, says Great Britain wants to reduce to the minimum consistent with the safety of the empire; but he does not indicate what that minimum is, and he probably will not know until many facts and policies have been developed in the conference.

The Japanese, in line with their talk of public sessions, are talking generally in the most liberal and open-minded way. A feeling pervades Washington that they feel they are under more or less suspicion, and must be at pains to demonstrate that they earnestly seek the success of the gathering. At the same time, there is a feeling that the Japanese are shrewdly protecting themselves against the suspicion that is directed against them in some quarters. To illustrate: Some of the Japanese have intimated that they will be willing to agree to depart entirely and wholly from China if the other nations having interests in China will. The thought of some is that the Japanese thereby show that they are not the only ones who have taken advantage of Chinese conditions, and also that some of the pressure upon them to get out of China should be put on other nations less severely criticized.

It is to be borne in mind constantly, in appraising the Japanese statements, direct and indirect, that there is a genuine movement in Japan for liberal methods and for world peace. There will be Japanese in Washington, other

than the delegation, to urge high world ideals upon the conference, and only a few days ago a dispatch from Tokyo carried this extract from an address made before the students of the Imperial University by Yukio Ozaki, former Minister of Justice:

It is not so much China's political condition as the absence of sincerity on Japan's part, that is responsible for the quandary confronting Japan over Shantung. The fact must be admitted that it has always been Japan's threat, direct or indirect, of armed force that has stood in the way of a real Chinese-Japanese reconciliation.

If the present Shantung policy is a departure from the old, high-handed attitude, the burden of proof rests with Japan. A solution will be reached only when Japan suc-

ceeds in convincing the Japanese of her sincerity, not by mere assurances but by deeds.

Some Japanese insist upon the open-door principle in the Pacific generally, including the other side of the ocean, to facilitate the solution of the emigration question. They must be reminded that this policy during twenty years has been advocated in a commercial sense alone. The emigration question is serious, no doubt, but it should not outweigh consideration for other nations' convenience and rights—circumstances which could easily be realized by assuming an influx, for instance, of Indians into this country.

Japan ought to be grateful to the powers for their sympathy in the matter of superfluous population, but we should not forget that this requires solution from within. There is nothing to be proud of in causing a nuisance to others through failure to control population.

WAR-ARMAMENT COSTS

Figures, revised and brought up to date by the United States Bureau of Efficiency, for use in the International Conference on Limitation of Armament, show that in 1921 past wars and current military and naval expenditures amounted to 82.5 cents out of every dollar, with 17.5 expended for all other activities. These figures show money actually expended. The Bureau of Efficiency, checking up the appropriations for 1922, finds that out of every dollar

appropriated 83.6 cents will be expended for past wars and the present establishment, with 16.4 cents for all other purposes.

While these figures show a somewhat smaller expense for war purposes than the 92.6 cents per dollar shown by Prof. Edward B. Rosa, of the United States Bureau of Standards, for a previous period, it is notable that the 1922 appropriations for war purposes exceed the figures for 1921.

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1921 FISCAL YEAR

Purpose.	1921. Amount expended.	Per cent of total exclusive of postal service.
1. Care and maintenance of veterans of the war of 1914, including compensation, rehabilitation, and hospital treatment	\$316,239,672	8.9
2. Pensions on account of military service prior to war of 1914 ...	279,150,000	7.9
3. Interest on the public debt	1,017,500,000	28.8
4. Contribution to sinking fund for amortization of public debt	287,500,000	8.1
I. Total appropriations incident to past wars	1,900,389,672	53.7
5. Military establishment	512,350,372	14.5
6. Naval establishment	503,895,012	14.3
II. Total appropriations for present national defense ...	1,016,245,384	28.8
Total for past wars and present national defense ..	2,916,635,056	82.5
III. Total appropriations for general purposes, except the postal service	619,822,093	17.5
Total for all purposes except the postal service	3,536,457,149	100.0
IV. Total appropriations for postal service	631,768,011	
Grand total	4,168,225,160	

This table includes the regular supply bills for the fiscal year 1921 and all deficiency acts made for service pertaining to that fiscal year, but excludes deficiencies for prior years.

APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1922 FISCAL YEAR

Purpose	1922 Appropriations.	Per cent of total exclusive of postal service.
1. Care and maintenance of veterans of war of 1914, including compensation, rehabilitation, hospital treatment, etc.	\$237,501,620	8.0
2. Pensions on account of military service prior to war of 1914	265,500,000	9.0
3. Interest on the public debt	922,650,000	31.2
4. Contribution to sinking fund for amortization of public debt	265,754,865	9.0
I. Total appropriations incident to past wars	1,691,406,485	57.2
5. Military establishment	356,121,809	12.0
6. Naval establishment	426,922,645	14.4
II. Total appropriations for present national defense ...	783,044,454	26.4
Total for past wars and present national defense ..	2,474,450,939	83.6
III. Total appropriations for general purposes, except the postal service	486,506,994	16.4
Total for all purposes except the postal service	2,960,957,933	100.0
IV. Total appropriations for postal service	574,092,552	
Grand total	3,535,050,485	

This statement takes into account all acts for the fiscal year 1922 passed up to July 21, 1921. It is not comparable with 1921 or any preceding year, since the totals and percentages will be changed by items in any deficiency appropriation or other acts passed subsequent to July 21, 1921.